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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue whether, in a federal court action in which subject-matter
jurisdiction is grounded on diversity of citizenship,' a nonresident
defendant's amenability to service of federal process is governed by a
standard based upon state or federal law has been aptly described as
existing somewhere in the "twilight zone" between substance and
procedure.2 As a result, it is arguable whether the Erie-York doctrine,3
which prescribes the rules governing application of state law by federal
diversity courts,* provides a simple answer. Moreover, irrespective of the
Erie- York problems presented by the twilight zone issue, there is a split of
authority among the federal courts on the appropriate due process
constraints that apply to a federal court's exercise of in personam
jurisdiction.5
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has directly addressed the
6twilight zone issue, and the lower federal courts have come down on bothsides of the question, some holding that a federal standard of amenability
1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). The twilight zone issue is framed in terms of diversity of
citizenship for the purposes of analysis of the Erie- York aspects of the problem. See text accompanying
notes 279-317 infra.
2. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 518 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.
concurring); Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754,756-57 (1st Cir. 1940); Note, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1662,
1665 (1961). In Sibbachv. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941), the Supreme Court defined "procedure"
as "the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them." By this definition, substantive
law is presumably comprised of those rights and duties which give rise to a remedy. The indistinct
nature of these definitions illustrates the difficulty inherent in attempting to draw a sharp line between
substance and procedure.
3. Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945). See text accompanying notes 141-55 infra.
4. The Erie- York doctrine holds that a federal diversity court must apply state substantive law
and state procedure when such procedure is outcome-determinative and bound up with state-created
rights and obligations. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536-38 (1958);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. at 108-09; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 78; Szantay v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 63-64 (4th Cir. 1965); H. GOODRICH & E. ScOLES, HANDBOOK OFTHE
CONFLICTS OFLAWS § 15, at25-31 (4th ed. 1964). Seetext accompanying notes 141-55 infra.
5. Compare Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), with Jaftex Corp. v.
Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960). See also Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,
326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946); Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1924); Iovino v.
Waterson, 274 F.2d 40,45 (4th Cir. 1960).
6. The 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted after the federal
standard-state standard controversy had developed, failed even to address the issue.
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to service of process is to apply,7 while others have required a test of
amenability based upon state jurisdictional law and policy.8 When the
issue has concerned the amenability to service of an original party
defendant to a diversity action,9 the majority of federal courts of appeals
have reached a consensus, relying at least in part on the Erie-York
doctrine, that state law controls.'°
Recent years have seen a similar twilight zone issue arise in the context
of amenability to bulge service of process issued pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(f)." Again, most federal courts that have addressed
the question have held that such amenability is to be tested by state law,'
2
although the bases of these decisions are often unclear and many have been
criticized. 3 Contrary to this weight of authority, in the recent case of
Sprow v. Hartford Insurance Co.,' 4 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
7. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960), overruled, Arrowsmithv.
United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d at 225; Berlanti Constr. Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 190 F. Supp. 126
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 26 F.R.D. 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Seealso, Oxford First
Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 198-203 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Holt v. Klosters Rederi
A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 356-57 (W.D. Mich. 1973); Edward J. Moriarity & Co. v. General Tire &
Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 38 1,389-91 (S.D. Ohio 1967); First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp.,
209 F. Supp. 730, 736-37 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Comment, Federal Jurisdiction over Foreign
Corporations and the Erie Doctrine, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1964); Note, Diversity Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts over Foreign Corporations, 49 IowA L. REV. 1224 (1964); Note, Corporate
Amenability to Process in the Federal Courts: State or Federal Jurisdictional Standards?, 48 MINN. L.
REV. 1131 (1964); Comment, Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations in Diversity Actions: A
771tyardfor the Knights of Erie, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 752 (1964).
8. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963). See also cases cited in
note 10 infra.
9. "Original party defendant" as used in this Comment refers to a party who the federal court can
reach through the normal avenues of service of process prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(a)-(e), without necessity of resort to rule 4(f) bulge service of process.
10. Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978); Wilkerson v. Fortuna
Corp., 554 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977); Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc.
v. Havey Fund-Raising Mgt., Inc., 519 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1975); Quarles v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 504
F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1974); Pujol v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 396 F.2d 430 (Ist Cir. 1968); Edwards v. St.
Louis-S.F.R.R., 361 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1966); Aftanse v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir.
1965); Mechanical Contractors Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n of N. Cal. Inc.,
342 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1965); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963); Walker v.
General Features Corp., 319 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963); Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541
(3d Cir. 1953). See, Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Cal. 1955); 2 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 4.25 (7) (1979) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]; C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS § 64, at 304 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT]; 4 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1075, at 309-12 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT & MILLER]; Comment, 43 B.U.L. REV. 409 (1963); Note, The Applicability of State or Federal
Law to Determine Whether In Personam Jurisdiction Exists over Non-Residents: Arrowsmith v.
United Press Int'l, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 320 (1964); Note, 77 HARV. L. REV. 559 (1964); Note, Second
Circuit Holds State Standard Determines Amenability of Foreign Corporation to Service of Process in
Diversity Action, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 119 (1964); Note, In Personam Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
over Foreign Corporations in Diversity Cases: State versus Federal Law under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 327 (1964); Comment, Federal Courts-Diversity Jurisdiction of Foreign
Corporation, 66 W. VA. L. REV. 137 (1963).
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f). See text accompanying note 19 infra.
12. Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1968); Pillsbury
Co. v. Delta Boat & Barge Rental, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 630 (E.D. La. 1976); Spearing v. Manhattan Oil
Trans. Co., 375 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y 1974); Pierce v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 63 (D.
Md. 1969); McGonigle v. Penn-Central Trans. Co., 49 F.R.D. 58 (D. Md. 1969); Karlsen v. Hanff, 278
F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
13. 4WRIGHT&MILLER, supranote 10,§ 1075,at314-15,§ 1127,at534-35.
14. 594F.2d412(5thCir. 1979).
RULE 4(f) BULGE SERVICE OF PROCESS
adopted a constitutionally based standard of amenability to federal rule
4(f) bulge service of process. Sprow held that due process is satisfied to the
party served with bulge process if there is a sufficient nexus between such
party and either the state in which the federal court sits or the bulge area
created by the 100-mile jurisdictional limit imposed on bulge process by
rule 4(f).' 5 Under the Sprow test, the sufficiency of this nexus between the
party served and the expanded federal forum created by rule 4(f) is
determined solely in light of the constitutional restraints of the minimum
contacts doctrine of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,16 without
reference to state jurisdictional law. 17 Although subject-matterjurisdiction
in Sprow was based on diversity of citizenship, the court did not address
the underlying Erie- York problems presented by application of a standard
of amenability based on federal rather than state law. Moreover, by
grounding its test upon the minimum contacts doctrine of International
Shoe, a doctrine based upon the due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment, the Sprow court failed to recognize that the
constraints of the fourteenth amendment, including International Shoe,
apply only to the states, and that the appropriate due process limitations
on a federal court's exercise of personal jurisdiction through bulge service
of process are those found in the fifth amendment to the Constitution. 8
This Case Comment will examine the standard of amenability to
service of federal process issue in the context of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(f) and in light of the Sprow holding and rationale by
addressing two major aspects of the twilight zone issue: first, whether
considerations of constitutional due process or the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require that amenability to bulge service of federal process be
determined in accordance with state law; and second, whether the Erie-
York doctrine mandates such a result. Specifically, it will be asserted that a
constitutional standard, as in Sprow, is a more reasoned, practical, and
appropriate test for determining amenability to bulge process than the
various state law standards applied by earlier cases. After examining the
bulge service of process provision, the policies supporting it, the facts and
holding of Sprow, the general background of the federal standard versus
state standard controversy and the effect of this controversy on the issue of
amenability to rule 4(f) bulge process, this Case Comment will also show
that the Sprow standard is more desirable than those previously applied-
even in light of the Erie- York doctrine-since the Sprow test more
effectively affords realization of the underlying policy considerations and
purposes of federal rule 4(f) bulge service of process. Insofar as Sprow is
based upon fourteenth amendment due process requirements, however,
this Case Comment must disagree with the Sprow analysis and rationale.
15. id. at 416.
16. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See text accompanying notes 89-97 infra.
17. Sprowv. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d at415-16.
18. C. WRIGHT, supra note 10, § 64, at 303. See also Edward J. Moriarity &Co. v. GeneralTire&
Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381,389-91 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
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Rather, this Case Comment will show that when rule 4(f) bulge service of
federal process is employed, the limitations on a federal court's jurisdiction
over the person should arise solely from the due process constraints of the
fifth amendment and any limits imposed by Congress in its grant of
extraterritorial jurisdictional authority.
II. THE BULGE SERVICE OF PROCESS PROVISION IN
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(f): AN OVERVIEW
The bulge service of process provision in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(f) provides:
[P]ersons who are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule 14, or as additional
parties to a pending action or a counterclaim or crossclaim therein pursuant
to Rule 19, may be served in the manner stated in paragraphs (1)-(6) of
subdivision (d) of this Rule at all places outside the state but within the United
States that are not more than 100 miles from the place in which the action is
commenced, or to which it is assigned or transferred for trial.19
The effect of this extraterritorial service provision is to expand the
geographic reach of federal district court process to all places within 100
miles of the federal courthouse, regardless of whether the place where
service is made is within the territorial boundaries of the state in which the
federal court sits. 20 The bulge process provision has effect, however, only
in the limited instances when the party sought to be served is a third-party
defendant under federal rule 14,21 or a person required for just
adjudication under federal rule 19.22 Bulge service of process has no
application to original party defendants to an action, unless such persons
classify as necessary or indispensable parties under rule 19.23
As can be seen by a reiding of the bulge process provision, rule 4(f)
does not expressly state that amenability to bulge service is to be
determined solely by reference to federal jurisdictional principles,
although such a construction is clearly plausible from both the language of
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). The bulge service of process provision is part of the 1963 amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts, 31 F.R.D. 587 (1963). Fora discussion of the initial reaction to the amendment,
see Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (I), 77 HARV. L. REV. 601
(1964); Vestal, Expanding the Jurisdictional Reach of the Federal Courts: The 1963 Changes in
Federal Rule 4, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1053 (1963); Note, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice: Proposed
Amendments for Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 OKLA. L. REv. 352 (1963). But see Nordbye,
Comments on ProposedAmendments to Rules of Civil Procedurefor United States District Courts, 18
F.R.D. 105,106-7(1956).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). Bulge service of process is an authorized extension of federal process
beyond the general state limits imposed by the initial provision of rule 4(f). See generally Mississippi
Publishing Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,442 (1946).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 14. See, e.g., Lee v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 445 F. Supp. 189 (D. Del. 1978) (rule
4(f) bulge process used to bring in a rule 14 third-party defendant).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 19. See, e.g., Delaware v. Bender, 370 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Del. 1974)(rule4(f)
bulge process used to bring in a rule 19 indispensable party).
23. Rule 4(f) bulge process has no application when the party sought to beserved is not a rule 14
or rule 19 party. White v. Diamond, 390 F. Supp. 867 (D. Md. 1974). Note, however, that bulge process
may also be used to bring in a person required to answer a commitment order for civil contempt. FED.
R. Civ. P. 4(f).
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the rule itself and the intent of its drafters.24 Courts that have held that a
state law standard of amenability is to apply,25 however, have done so on
the assumption that rule 4(f) relates only to the manner and scope of
federal service of process and does not provide an independent basis for a
federal court's assertion of in personam jurisdiction.26 Therefore,
according to the reasoning of these courts, reference must be made to the
appropriate state law to determine whether that law allows the court to
exercise jurisdiction over the party served with bulge process. 27 These state
law standard courts have, however, reached varying conclusions on the
question of what is the appropriate state law, some holding that reference
is to be made to the law of the state in which the federal court sits (i.e. the
forum state),28 while others require that amenability be determined in
accordance with the law of the state in which bulge service of process is
effected (i.e. the state of service). 29 By contrast, Sprow v. Hartford
Insurance Co. developed its federal law test of amenability to bulge service
of process on the reasoning that the bulge provision of federal rule 4(f)
itself affords a distinct basis for a federal court's assertion of personal
jurisdiction. °
III. THE POLICY BASES OF FEDERAL RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(f) BULGE SERVICE OF PROCESS
The Notes of the Advisory Committee on the bulge service of process
provision in federal rule 4(f) state that
[t]he bringing in of parties under the 100-mile provision in the limited
situations enumerated is designed to promote the objective of enabling the
court to determine entire controversies. In light of present-day facilities for
communication and travel, the territorial range of the service
allowed . . . can hardly work hardship on the parties summoned. The
provision will be especially useful in metropolitan areas spanning more than
one state. . . . The amendment is but a moderate extension of the territorial
reach of Federal process and has ample practical justification.31
24. See text accompanying notes 31-48 infra.
25. Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1968); Pillsbury
Co. v. Delta Boat & Barge Rental, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 630 (E.D. La. 1976); Spearing v. Manhattan Oil
Trans. Co., 375 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Piercev. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 63 (D.
Md. 1969); McGonigle v. Penn-Central Trans. Co., 49 F.R.D. 58 (D. Md. 1969); Karlsen v. Hanff, 278
F. Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also School District of Kansas Cityv. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421,
435-36 (W.D. Mo. 1978); R. Clinton Const. Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838, 849 n.9
(N.D. Miss. 1977).
26. See cases cited in note 25 supra. See also Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece,
Ministry of Commerce, Purchase Directorate, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931
(1966); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
27. See, e.g., Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d at 252; Karlsen v.
Hanff, 278 F. Supp. at 865.
28. 278F.Supp.at865.
29. Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d at 252; Spearing v.
Manhattan Oil Trans. Co., 375 F. Supp. at 771.
30. Sprowv. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d at416.
31. Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of ProposedAmendments to Certain Rules
of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 31 F.R.D. 621,629 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Advisor' Committee's Notes].
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From these notes, and from the wording of the bulge provision itself,
3 2
it is clear that rule 4(f) bulge service of process is intended to encourage
solution in one judicial proceeding of the many issues that may arise in
complex multiparty, multistate litigation.33 Presumably, this policy is
meant not only to foster convenience to the parties and the courts, but also,
in the limited situations in which bulge service applies, to provide a forum
for cases in which jurisdiction over all interested or necessary parties can-
not otherwise be obtained through use of state long-arm authority, 4 or
which the parallel state courts do not handle and perhaps cannot handle
because of constitutional limitations. In order to attain these goals, bulge
process reflects a balance struck between the federal interest in resolution
of complicated litigation in one proceeding and the individual's interest in
defending himself in a convenient forum, with the balance weighing in
favor of "the benefits that may be obtained from the disposition by a
federal court of an entire controversy.
35
This is not to suggest that the mandates of due process and
fundamental fairness to nonresident litigants are not to be afforded their
full effect; rather, it illustrates one of the major thrusts behind the federal
rules in general, and rule 4(f) in particular-that modern federal procedure
is a balance between the traditional restraints of jurisdictional principles
and the need for efficient and economical adjudication of complex
controversies.36
The policy encouraging resolution of entire controversies is not
limited to the bulge service of process provision of rule 4(f). It appears time
and again throughout the federal rules. Particularly relevant in this regard
are the federal rules relating to counterclaims and cross-claims, 37 third-
party practice, 38 joinder of claims and remedies, 39 joinder of persons
needed for just adjudication, 40 permissive joinder of parties,4a misjoinder
and non-joinder of parties,42 and interpleader.43 Each of these rules is
structured to maximizej oinder of either claims or parties in order to secure
complete adjudication of the controversy before the court." Indeed, the
scope provision of the federal rules demands that they "be construed to
32. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
33. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 1127, at 532.
34. Kaplan, supra note 19, at 632.
35. McGoniglev. Penn-CentralTrans. Co.,49 F.R.D. at 62.
36. See generally Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966), rehearing denied, 384
U.S. 915 (1966); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962); Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage
Corp., 348 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1965).
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 18.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 21.
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 22.
44. See generally M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 60,66 (1972).
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secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. 45
The resolution of entire controversies in one proceeding clearly fosters that
result.
A similar philosophy favoring solution of entire cases in one court
action can be seen in the federal statutes allowing nationwide service of
federal process, particularly the Federal Interpleader Act,46 which
provides for nationwide process in a context that has traditionally been
considered the realm of diversity jurisdiction and which serves as
precedent for the rule 4(f) bulge provision.47 Thus, it can be seen that the
policy of determination of entire controversies not only forms the
backbone of bulge service of process, but is also a major federal
consideration that must be given effect to the maximum extent practicable
whenever conflicting interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are at issue.45
IV. THE FACTS AND HOLDING OF
Sprow v. Hartford Insurance Co.
Plaintiffs, residents of Louisiana, brought an action based upon
diversity of citizenship in the federal district court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana, located in New Orleans, on a claim for relief arising from a
motor vehicle accident near Port Sulphur, Louisiana.49 Defendant,
Hartford Insurance Co. (Hartford), was the insurer of L. D. Gollott, who,
in conjunction with his brother, E. M. Gollott, operated a seafood business
in Biloxi, Mississippi.50 E. M. Gollott was the registered owner of the other
vehicle involved in the accident out of which this litigation arose.
51
According to an alleged agreement between the Gollott brothers, this
vehicle was to be insured by L. D. Gollott. 52 At the time of the accident,
however, L. D. Gollott's insurance policy with Hartford did not cover the
Gollott vehicle.53
Prior to the accident, L. D. Gollott had allegedly instructed Arnold
Breseman, an agent and partner of Frazier Insurance Co. (Frazier) and
representative of Hartford, to add E. M. Gollott's vehicle to L. D. Gollott's
existing policy with Hartford 4 On the grounds that Breseman and Frazier
were negligent in failing to provide the additional insurance coverage
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. See generally Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438
(1946). Butsee Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286(1969), rehearing denied, 394 U.S. 1025 (1969).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1335.
47. Vestal, supra note 19, at 1059 n.38.
48. See generally Gutor International AG v. Raymond Packer Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 938, 946 (1st
Cir. 1974); Montecatini Edison, S.P.A. v. Ziegler, 486 F.2d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
49. Sprowv. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d412,414 (5th Cir. 1979).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
1980]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
allegedly requested by L. D. Gollott, defendant Hartford impleaded
Breseman and Frazier as third-party defendants pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 14(a)." Breseman and Frazier were served with process
at Frazier's principal place of business in Pascagoula, Mississippi. 6 The
district court granted Breseman's and Frazier's motions for summary
judgment on the ground that the third-party defendants did not have
sufficient contacts with Louisiana to allow the court to assert personal
jurisdiction on the basis of the Louisiana long-arm statute.57
Third-party plaintiff Hartford argued that, regardless of the third-
party defendants' failure to satisfy the triggering elements of the state long-
arm statute, personal jurisdiction over Breseman and Frazier could be
obtained through the bulge service of process provision in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(f).5 In response, and relying on prior decisions that had
held that rule 4(f) relates only to the manner and scope of service of federal
process and not to amenability to suit, 9 the third-party defendants
asserted that process can issue pursuant to the bulge provision of rule 4(f)
only if the nonresident defendant otherwise has sufficient contacts with the
state in which the federal court is held to justify in personam jurisdiction
under the state long-arm statute.60 The district court, however, did not
decide whether personal jurisdiction over the third-party defendants could
be obtained through the bulge service of process provision in rule 4(f).61
On appeal by Hartford, the Fifth Circuit noted that Frazier was a
partnership licensed to do business solely in Mississippi, doing no business
in nor deriving any benefits from Louisiana, and whose only connection
with Louisiana was periodic communications with the Hartford office in
New Orleans. 62 The court of appeals agreed with the district court that, on
these facts alone, Breseman and Frazier did not have a sufficient nexus
with Louisiana to allow personal jurisdiction to be asserted under the
Louisiana long-arm statute.63 The Fifth Circuit then reached the issue of
rule 4(f) bulge service of process, holding that the third-party defendants
Breseman and Frazier could be amenable to suit in the federal district
court in Louisiana on that basis.64
By stating that "Rule 4(f) offers a distinct basis for [a federal] court's
jurisdiction,"65 the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the position of the third-
party defendants and other federal courts that the bulge provision speaks
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at415.
59. See cases cited in notes 25-26 supra.
60. 594F.2dat416.
61. Id. at415-16.
62. Id. at415.
63. Id.
64. Id. at416.
65. Id.
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to the manner and scope of service of federal process but not to when a
party served is subject to the jurisdiction of the court.6 The court went on
to enunciate its standard of amenability to suit under the bulge service of
process provision, holding that, in accordance with "the basic con-
stitutional principles in [the] area [of personal jurisdiction], . . . the
appropriate due process rule which governs Rule 4(f) is whether the party
served had minimum contacts with the forum state or the bulge area so that
it is fair and substantially just for the forum to impose judgment upon the
party., 67 Although the court did not expressly state that it was formulating
a standard grounded solely on federal law, rather than state law, this
result is readily apparent from: (1) the court's rejection of the rationale of
earlier cases holding that state jurisdictional principles must be satisfied
before rule 4(f) bulge process can issue;68 (2) the court's statement that its
standard of amenability follows the "basic constitutional principles"
governing the assertion of personal jurisdiction;69 (3) the fact that the only
limitations the court placed upon application of the 100-mile bulge
provision were the constraints of the due process clause; 70 and (4) the
, • •71
opinion's total lack of reference to statejurisdictional law.
In finding support for its adoption of a constitutional standard of
amenability, the Fifth Circuit noted that since rule 4(f) bulge service of
process is an expansion of federal district court jurisdiction beyond the
general state geographic boundary limits imposed by the federal rule
relating to the territorial limits of effective service of process, 72 "the logical
test for due process purposes is the connection between the nonresident
and the geographical area included within that [expanded]jurisdiction. 73
66. Id. See cases cited in notes 25-26 supra.
67. 594 F.2d at 416. In this regard, the court relied on Professor Kaplan's analysis of the
jurisdictional impact of federal rule 4(f) bulge service of process:
[Ilt seems a roughly accurate formula of decision to hold that the party should be amenable to
the federal process if, considering its activities within the forum state plus the 100 mile area, it
would be amenable to that state's process, had the state embraced this area and exerted
judicialjurisdiction over the party to the degree constitutionally allowable.
Kaplan, supra note 19, at 633. Note, however, that this formula appears to incorporate the fourteenth
amendment due process considerations of the International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine into a
test of a federal court's in personam power. Generally, fourteenth amendment due process is not
applicable to the federal courts. See text accompanying notes 82-140 infra.
68. 594 F.2d at 416. See also cases cited in notes 25-26 supra.
69. 594 F.2d at 416. But see text accompanying notes 82-140 infra.
70. 594 F.2d at 416. The court, after stating that rule 4() bulge service of process is limited to
some extent by considerations of due process, noted that
it is possible that a set of facts may arise where it would be fundamentally unfair to subject a
party served within the bulge area to the forum's jurisdiction. The clearest example . . . is
that of a corporation whose only contact with the forum state or bulge area is its officer's
temporary presence within the bulge at the time of service.
Presumably, this statement reflects the court's concern with indications in Shafferv. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 207-12 (1977) relating to the continued validity of transient in personamjurisdiction. See also text
accompanying notes 128-140 infra.
71. Compare Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250,252 (2d Cir.
1968). See text accompanying notes 229-65 infra.
72. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). See also text accompanying notes 119-25 infra.
73. 594F.2dat4l6.
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This statement reflects the court's unarticulated premise that, regardless of
the Erie- York doctrine, state jurisdictional law should have no effect on a
federal court's power to reach a nonresident defendant when the court is
exercising extraterritorial authority, based solely on federal law, pursuant
to a valid extension of the court's jurisdictional base. The court's reasoning
appears to be that since the expanded jurisdictional area created by the
bulge provision exists solely because of federal authority and has no
counterpart in traditional concepts of jurisdiction as defined by state
territorial boundaries, the only logical course in testing a federal court's
power over the person of a nonresident found within this expanded
jurisdiction is to follow federal, not state, law.
The court found further justification for its position in the policy of
rule 4(f) to allow a federal district court to resolve entire controversies in
one proceeding. 74 The court stated that a standard of amenability based on
the law of the forum state, as advocated by the third-party defendants
Breseman and Frazier in their attempt to avoid the jurisdictional reach of
the district court, "would eviscerate Rule 4(f), reducing it to merely a
secondary means of serving persons already subject to the forum state's
jurisdiction through its long-arm statute, 75 and that such a result was
clearly not the intent of rule 4(f)'s drafters.76 Moreover, the court indicated
that any standard of amenability to bulge process other than one based
solely on federal constitutional principles would also be an unreasonable
restraint on effectuation of the policy behind rule 4(f) to enable
determination of entire controversies.77
In concluding its discussion of the rule it had adopted, the court
summarized its position by stating that "a due process requirement of a
meaningful nexus with the bulge area or forum state strikes a reasonable
balance between the legislative interest [in determining entire controver-
sies in one proceeding] and the interest of the nonresident in fundamental
fairness. ' 78 This is a recognition by the court that any standard of personal
jurisdiction that runs to the constitutional limits is essentially a balancing
of the interests of the court and the plaintiff (in this instance, the third-
party plaintiff) in efficiently resolving the dispute in an available and
convenient forum, against the quality of the relationship between the party
sought and the forum, in light of the jurisdictional reach of the court.79
Since the Sprow standard includes both of these essential elements, it
74. Id. at 417. See also Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 31, at 629.
75. 594 F.2d at417.
76. Id.
77. Id. The court noted that its "development of a governing constitutional rule must take into
account this significant procedural policy. Otherwise, the application of Rule 4(f) will be unreasonably
constructed [sic] and the objective of efficient adjudication of extraterritorial disputes will be
thwarted."
78. Id.
79. Kulko v. Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84,92 (1978).
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appears to be well within the limits of the due process clause.8 ° As a result,
Sprow can rationally be challenged only as inappropriate in that it runs
contrary to the Erie- York doctrine, which some courts appear to consider
controlling on the issue of amenability to suit in a federal court.8 ' This Case
Comment will show, however, that the Erie- York doctrine presents no
such obstacle to a standard of amenability to bulge service of process based
solely on federal law.
The net effect of the Sprow constitutional standard of amenability is
that the power of a federal district court to reach a nonresident with bulge
process is conditioned only on the nonresident being within the class of
parties able to be brought into an action by bulge service of process, and on
the nonresident having a sufficient nexus with the expanded bulge
jurisdiction of the court. Under Sprow, the sufficiency of this nexus is
determined solely by reference to the due process requirements of the
International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine, without regard to the law
of the state in which the federal court is held or the law of the state in which
bulge process is served.
V. THE PARAMETERS OF THE TWILIGHT ZONE
A. Introduction: The Scope of the Issues
The twilight zone is that nebulous gray area between substance and
procedure essentially comprised of the issue whether a nonresident
defendant's amenability to suit in a federal court is determined by reference
to federal or state law. Although the issue originally arose in the context of
the amenability to suit of an original party defendant to a diversity action,
the question addressed by this Case Comment is somewhat more narrow-
namely, whether amenability to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) bulge
service of process is governed by a test based upon federal law or state law.
Inherent in this question are two major issues: first, the nature and scope of
the constitutional due process limitations placed upon a federal court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a party sought to be served with
bulge process; and second, whether the Erie- York doctrine requires that a
state law test of amenability be applied.
B. The Constraints of Due Process ofLaw
Amenability to service of process is a necessary prerequisite to a
forum obtaining jurisdiction over the person of a defendant. 82 The reach of
80. Which due process clause is another question, however. See text accompanying notes 82-140
infra.
81. The court in Sprow did not address the issue of whether the Erie- York doctrine mandates
application of a state law standard of amenability to rule 4(f) bulge service of process, although the
issue had been dealt with by prior cases raising the same or similar issues, see, e.g., Coleman v.
American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1968); Arrowsmith v. United Press
Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963); Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960); and
by legal commentary relied on by the Sprow court, see Kaplan, supra note 19, at 631-34.
82. C. WRIGHT, supra note 10, § 64, at301-02.
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a forum's in personam power is, in turn, governed by the constraints of due
process of law.83 The limitations of due process on a federal court's exercise
of personal jurisdiction is perhaps the most confusing issue in the realm of
federal jurisdiction.84 Although it is clear that a federal court's power to
reach a defendant is limited to some extent by considerations of due
process,85 the federal courts have not agreed on the source or substance of
the due process constraints.8 6 The most famous line of cases dealing with
judicial authority to assert personal jurisdiction is that represented by the
International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine,87 and many of the federal
courts that have considered these due process questions have held that the
constraints of International Shoe are binding on the federal courts.88
Under the International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine,89 a forum's
ability to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is
conditioned on the existence of a sufficient relationship between the
nonresident and the forum.90 The sufficiency of this nexus is determined by
reference to the nature and quality of the nonresident's contacts with the
forum "in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which
it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." 91 Contacts sufficient
to justify assertion of jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident may
range from isolated commercial transactions or tortious activity to a
systematic and continuous relationship with the forum.92 The ultimate test
of the legitimacy of a forum's assertion of jurisdiction is whether such an
83. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316(1945).
84. See generally Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 198-203 (E.D.
Pa. 1974); First Flight Corp. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 736-37 (E.D. Tenn.
1962).
85. See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,733 (1877) ("[P]roceedings in a court of justice
to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has nojurisdiction do
not constitute due process of law."). See also Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22
U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1955); Green, Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due
Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Green].
86. Compare Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973), with Scott v.
Middle East Airlines Co., S.A., 240 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
87. See text accompanying notes 89-97 infra.
88. See, e.g., Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1979); Coleman v. American
Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1968); Karlsen v. Hanff, 278 F. Supp. 865
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Scott v. Middle East Airlines Co., S.A., 240 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Paragon Oil
Co. v. Panama Ref. & Petrochem. Co., 192 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); C. WRIGHT, supra note 10, §
64, at 303 n.42; Abraham, Constitutional Limitations upon the Territorial Reach of Federal Process, 8
VILL. L. REV. 520,534 (1963).
89. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also World-wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 580 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980); Kulko v.
Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84 (1979); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528
(1953); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457
(1940). See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review. 25 U. CmI. L. REV. 569 (1958).
90. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. at 316.
91. Id. at 319.
92. Compare Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), with Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
RULE 4(f) BULGE SERVICE OF PROCESS
exercise of judicial authority is consistent with "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. 93 Although the minimum contacts test is not
one which can be mechanically or quantitatively applied,94 it is clear that
the nonresident defendant must engage in some purposeful act, of more
substance than mere accidental or unintentional presence within the
forum, which affords him some benefit or privilege of the forum. 95
Moreover, at least when the nature of the nonresident's contacts with the
forum are singular or relatively isolated, the claim for relief that is at the
basis of the forum's exercise ofjurisdictional authority must arise from the
contacts of the nonresident with the forum.9 6 Any state standard of
amenability to suit must be within these due process constraints of the
minimum contacts doctrine. The courts have made it abundantly clear that
a state's assertion of personal jurisdiction beyond the limits imposed by the
minimum contacts doctrine contravenes the due process guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment. 97 The net result of the minimum contacts doctrine
is that a state can reach a nonresident defendant only if such person has a
sufficient meaningful nexus with the territory of that state.
Although the minimum contacts doctrine of International Shoe may
impose constraints on the federal courts in certain situations,9" this
limitation on a federal court's power of personaljurisdiction is not dictated
by the Constitution.99 International Shoe and its line of cases defined the
ability of state courts to reach nonresident defendants. 1' ° The minimum
contacts doctrine is an extension of the fourteenth amendment and, as
such, is applicable only to the states.' 0 ' The due process considerations
controlling on the federal courts are those found in the fifth amendment,
10 2
and these fifth amendment constraints are not necessarily identical to
those of the International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine, although the
minimum contacts concept may be adopted under the fifth amendment by
analogy. °3The fundamental distinction between fifth amendment jurisdictional
93. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. at 316.
94. Id. at 319.
95. Hansonv. Denckla, 357 U.S. at251-53. But see Atkinsonv. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. 2d 338,342-
48,316 P.2d 960,963-69 (1957).
96. Singer, PPA v. Piaggio & Co., 420 F.2d 679 (1st Cir. 1970). See generally World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 580 (1980).
97. See cases cited in note 89 supra. See also World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S.
Ct. at 564-66; Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. at 720,732-33.
98. See text accompanying notes 119-27 infra.
99. Edward J. Moriarity & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381,389-91 (S.D.
Ohio 1967).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. See also Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/ S, 355 F. Supp. at 356-57.
103. Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. at 356-57; Edward J. Moriarity&Co. v. General
Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. at 390; Green, supra note 85, at 970,986. See also Oxford First Corp.
v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. at 199; First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F.
Supp. at736-37; Comment, 7 Rtrr.-CAaI. L.J. 158,161 (1975).
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due process, controlling on the federal courts, and fourteenth amendment
jurisdictional due process, controlling on the state courts, arises from the
most basic premise of in personam power: that a sovereign, whether it be
national or state, can assert personal jurisdiction over any party having a
sufficient purposeful relationship with the forum of that sovereign. 0 4 This
premise contemplates two essential, interrelated elements: first, the
requisite relationship between the party sought and the sovereign; and
second, the concept of forum. The former element, which remains constant
for both the state and the federal courts and thus does not distinguish
federal jurisdictional power from state jurisdictional power, is defined in
terms of either presence within or sufficient contacts with the forum. The
latter element, the concept of forum, which is the crux of the distinction
between the jurisdictional due process constraints on the state and the
federal courts, is a function of the territorial limitations of the sovereign.
10 5
In other words, the concept and the power of the forum, and thus the
differing extents to which state and federal courts may reach the person of
a defendant, are not a consequence of the geographic location of the court
that is asserting jurisdiction, but rather arise from and are equivalent to the
power of the sovereign of which that court is a part. 
106
In the instance of a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction, the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, as outlined by the
minimum contacts doctrine of International Shoe, defines the forum
according to state geographic boundaries, these boundaries representing
the limits of the state's sovereign power. As a result, a state can exercise
personal jurisdiction only over those persons present within the forum or
having certain minimum contacts with the state as a sovereign territorial
entity."'
When in personam power is asserted by a federal court, however, no
such state territorial limitation constitutionally adheres. °8 The forum of a
federal court is constitutionally defined by the territorial boundaries of the
United States as a sovereign nation, not by the geographic limits of the
state in which the federal court has its situs.l09 Such a definition of the
federal forum is a consequence of the fact that a federal court is a part of
104. First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. at 736; See generally Abraham,
supra note 88, at 531-34. As this concept first developed, the relationship between the party over whom
jurisdiction was sought and the forum was defined in terms of presence within the territorial
boundaries of the sovereign. Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. at 720; Abraham, supra note 88, at531-32. The
concept has evolved to now hold that this relationship is determined by reference to the contacts of the
party sought with the forum of the sovereign. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316-
17; Abraham, supra note 88, at 533-34.
105. Edward J. Moriarity & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. at 390. See also
Hansonv. Denckla, 357 U.S. at25 1.
106. Edward J. Moriarity & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. at 390.
107. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316-17.
108. Edward J. Moriarity & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. at 390; Green,
supra note 85, at 970; Note, Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts over Foreign Corporations, 69
HARv. L. REV. 508 (1956).
109. Id.
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the federal government, whose sovereign power extends nationwide."0
Thus, the limits of fifth amendment due process on a federal court's in
personam reach allow a federal court to assert jurisdiction over any party
found within or having a sufficient relationship with the territory of the
United States. This concept of a nationwide federal forum has been
recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Union Pacific
Railroad,"' in which the Court noted that a federal court can, under the
Constitution, exercise personal jurisdiction through service of appropriate
process "anywhere within the limits of the territory over which the federal
government exercises dominion."' 1 2 The Court expressly stated that,
although Congress had not chosen to so organize the lower federal courts,
nothing in the Constitution prevents a federal court from reaching a party
found anywhere within the United States.1' 3 This reference to the
constitutional authority of the federal courts clearly includes the fifth
amendment's due process constraints. As a result, the due process clause of
the fifth amendment poses no obstacle to a federal court's exercise of
nationwide in personam jurisdiction, even though fourteenth amendment
due process considerations may prevent a similarjurisdictional reach from
being effected by a parallel state court. As can be seen by the above
analysis, the due process constraints of the fifth amendment imposed on
the federal courts are more lenient than those placed on state courts by the
fourteenth amendment.
Given this distinction between the constitutional due process
authority of state and federal courts to exert personal jurisdiction, the
question remains what due process standard is to govern the federal courts'
power. In the context of state in personam jurisdiction, the International
Shoe minimum contacts doctrine has evolved as the standard by which
fourteenth amendment due process is to be measured. 114 No comparable
due process doctrine has been unequivocally developed for implementa-
tion of the fifth amendment's constraints on the federal courts, presumably
because Congress generally has not structured the federal judicial power in
a manner that would allow federal court assertion of personal jurisdiction
to the nationwide limits permitted by the Constitution." 5 In the few cases
that have addressed a standard of fifth amendment due process constraints
on the federal courts, the majority of lower federal courts have analogized
to the International Shoe fourteenth amendment minimum contacts
doctrine and held that a federal court can assert personal jurisdiction over
a party if that party is present within the territorial limits of the United
110. Edward J. Moriarity& Co. v. GeneralTire& Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. at 390.
Ill. 98 U.S. 569 (1878). See also Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,442
(1946); Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1924); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 300,328 (1838).
112. United States v. Union Pacific R.R., 98 U.S. at 603.
113. Id.at 604.
114. See text accompanying notes 89-97 supra.
115. See text accompanying notes 119-27 infra.
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States or has a sufficient nexus (i.e. minimum contacts) with the United
States. 116 Conversely, one federal court has indicated that the appropriate
test to be applied is one based on fundamental fairness to the party over
whom jurisdiction is sought.1 17 Since fairness is inherent in the
International Shoe test,' 18 an analogy to the minimum contacts doctrine
would appear to provide a satisfactory working rule for governance of a
federal court's assertion of extraterritorial personal jurisdiction.
Although under the Constitution the federal courts are capable of
exercising personal jurisdiction over a party found anywhere within the
territory of the United States, 1 9 Congress need not authorize the federal
judiciary to act to the constitutional limits. 20 Indeed, Congress has,
through its rule-making delegate, limited the in personam reach of the
federal courts by the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.121
Federal rule 4(f), relating to the territorial limits of effective service of
federal process, begins by stating that "all process other than a subpoena
may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which
the district court is held, and, when authorized by a statute of the United
States or by these Rules, beyond the territorial limits of that state."'122 The
effect of this provision is to narrow the in personam jurisdiction of the
federal courts from the nationwide reach permitted by the Constitution to
a jurisdictional reach effective, with certain limited exceptions, only within
the state in which the federal court sits. Only when permitted by a federal
statute or Rule of Civil Procedure can a federal court exert personal
jurisdiction beyond the territorial borders of the state in which it is held. 123
Congress has enacted a few, specialized statutes authorizing ex-
traterritorial or nationwide service of federal process. 124 The federal rules
also contain a few provisions for extraterritorial service by a federal court,
these primarily being the bulge service of process provision of rule 4(f) and
the borrowing provision of rule 4(e).125
116. Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. at 357; Edward J. Moriarity & Co. v. General
Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. at 390; First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. at
736-37; Abraham, supra note 88, at 537; Green, supra note 85, at 970.
117. Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. at 198-204. See also Lone Star
Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954).
118. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316-17. See also cases cited in note 117
supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 98-113 supra.
120. United States v. Union Pacific R.R., 98 U.S. at 603; Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F.
Supp. at 357.
121. FED.R.CIv.P.4.
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
123. Id.
124. Foster, Judicial Economy; Fairness and Convenience of Place of Trial: Long-Arm
Jurisdiction in District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73, 100-102 (1968). See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 5, 25 (antitrust
actions by the United States); 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (actions against federal officers or agencies); 28
U.S.C. § 1692 (certain instances of receivership); 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (stockholders' derivative actions); 28
U.S.C. § 2321 (actions to review Interstate Commerce Commission orders); 28 U.S.C. § 2361
(interpleader); 28 U.S.C. § 2413 (execution in favor of the United States).
125. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e); FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e); FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(d)(3). See also
Foster, supra note 124, at 100-02.
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In the instance of federal statutory authorization of extraterritorial
service, or of the bulge process authorization of rule 4(f), the due pro-
cess constraints of the fifth amendment, outlined above, govern the
federal court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction. In such a case, the
fourteenth amendment due process restrictions of International Shoe,
being relevant only to the states, have no constitutionally mandated
applicability. Extraterritorial federal service accomplished through the
borrowing provision of rule 4(e), however, presents a different situation.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e), in pertinent part, states:
Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is
held provides . . . for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in
lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the
state . . . service may . . . be made under the circumstances and in the
manner prescribed in the statute or rule.12
6
This provision authorizes a federal district court, attempting to reach
a party not found within the territory of the state in which the federal court
is held and not amenable to suit under either the federal statutes
authorizing extraterritorial service or the bulge process provision of rule
4(f), to borrow the long-arm authority of the state in which the federal
court sits.1 27 Since state long-arm jurisdiction is subject to the fourteenth
amendment due process constraints of the International Shoe minimum
contacts doctrine, it follows that a federal court borrowing the state long-
arm power is also bound by the dictates of International Shoe. This
imposition of the International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine on the
federal courts is, however, mandated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4,
not by the Constitution, whose due process restrictions permit the federal
courts to effect nationwide in personam jurisdiction. Moreover, this
intermingling of the fourteenth amendment due process constraints of
International Shoe with federal in personam authority occurs only when
the federal court is proceeding under the borrowing provision of rule 4(e).
When a federal court is asserting extraterritorial personal jurisdiction on
the basis of authority pursuant to rule 4(f) (i.e. federal extraterritorial
service statutes or the bulge service of process provision), the court is
limited solely by the constraints of fifth amendment due process and any
limitations imposed by Congress or its rule-making delegate in the grant of
extraterritorial authority.
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
127. Under this borrowing provision of rule 4(e), the issue has arisen whether a federal court may
assert in personam jurisdiction to the limits permitted by International Shoe or whether the court is
bound by the jurisdictional reach chosen by the state in which the federal court sits. See text
accompanying notes 156-96 infra. When a state has extended its long-arm jurisdiction to the
constitutional limits, the question is largely theoretical inasmuch as both tests of amenability will be
identical. A state need not, however, assert jurisdictional power to the limits allowed by International
Shoe. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. at 440,446; Pulson v. American Rolling Mill
Co., 170 F.2d 193, 194 (Ist Cir. 1948). In such a context, the majority of federal courts have followed
Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), in holding that the federal court is bound
by the state jurisdictional choice. See text accompanying notes 168-85 infra. See also cases cited in note
10supra.
1980]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
This distinction between the applicable due process constraints on a
federal court, depending upon whether the court is asserting personal
jurisdiction pursuant to purely federal authority or borrowed state long-
arm authority, appears to have evaded some of the federal courts that have
considered the issue. Although such confusion will likely not, in the
ordinary case, result in any practical difference in outcome,1 28 it does
represent a major conceptual flaw in analysis of federal in personam
power. In Sprow, the court expressly grounded its standard of amenability
to rule 4(f) bulge service of process on the minimum contacts doctrine of
International Shoe. 129 The court did not, however, indicate whether it was
incorporating the minimum contacts concept into its test of amenability
because it felt such a result was compelled by the Constitution or merely
because it was reasoning by analogy. 130
Sprow's incorporation of the International Shoe minimum contacts
doctrine into its standard for amenability to bulge service of process
conceivably may have been predicated upon one of three possible views of
constitutional limitations upon federal in personam power. These
possibilities are:
(1) federal personal jurisdiction is controlled by the fourteenth amend-
ment, such that application of an International Shoe minimum
contacts test is mandated by fourteenth amendment considerations of
due process;
(2) due process as contemplated by the fifth amendment is the functional
equivalent of fourteenth amendment due process, such that, even
though a federal court's assertion of in personam jurisdiction pursuant
to rule 4(f) is governed solely by fifth amendment due process
considerations, constitutional principles demand that an International
Shoe minimum contacts test of amenability be applied;
(3) the federal courts are limited solely by fifth amendment, not fourteenth
amendment, due process, and these fifth amendment constraints are
considerably less restrictive than those imposed on the states by the
fourteenth amendment and International Shoe-however, in order to
formulate a workable and understandable rule of fifth amendment due
process, the minimum contacts concept is incorporated by analogy
into the constraints on the federal courts, 131 such that a federal court
can constitutionally reach any person present within or having
minimum contacts with the nationwide forum of the United States,
subject only to such limitations on a federal court's jurisdictional
128. This is so primarily because Congress has not, except for a few limited and specialized
instances, allowed the lower federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the nationwide limits
permitted by the fifth amendment. See generally Foster, supra note 124, at 99-102.
129. 594F.2dat416.
130. The court merely stated that it was "following the basic constitutional principles in the
area." Id.
131. See text accompanying notes 115-18 supra.
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power as may be imposed by federal statute or rule (such as those
imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4).32
The first two of these possible analyses are clearly at odds with the
applicable constitutional principles of federal jurisdictional power. The
federal courts are not restricted by fourteenth amendment due process.
133
Moreover, fifth amendment due process, controlling the federal courts, is
not the equivalent of the due process constraints of the fourteenth
amendment. 134 As a result, if Sprow is proceeding on the premise that the
International Shoe minimum contact doctrine must, out of constitutional
necessity, govern bulge service of process because of either of the first two
possible approaches advanced above, then the decision must be considered
as having a faulty conceptual basis. If, however, Sprow is applying the
minimum contacts concept to fifth amendment due process by analogy, in
accordance with the third approach above, then its reasoning can be
reconciled with the general principles of federal in personam jurisdictional
power.
Since bulge service of process is an authorized extraterritorial
extension of federal jurisdiction pursuant to purely federal law, rather than
a federal-state law combination under rule 4(e),135 the only constraints on a
federal court's bulge in personam reach are those of fifth amendment due
process, which permits nationwide personal jurisdiction, and of any
additional limits imposed by the Supreme Court, as rule-making delegate
of Congress, in authorizing the extraterritorial jurisdiction. It is this latter
aspect that limits a federal court's reach through bulge jurisdiction. By its
own language, rule 4(f) limits bulge service to within 100 miles of the court
effecting process. 13 6 As a result, within this 100 mile bulge the only due
process constraints on a federal court's power of personal jurisdiction are
those imposed by the fifth amendment, and whether the standard for these
constraints be set as a minimum contacts analogy 137 or as a basic fairness
test,138 a federal court can reach any party found within or having a suf-
ficient relationship with the bulge and who otherwise falls within the para-
meters of rule 4(f). In this regard, Sprow noted that due process con-
siderations may prevent a court from reaching a party only temporarily
132. It is possible that a court may accept this third analysis of the constitutional limitations
upon federal in personamjurisdiction, but may then confuse the congressional limitations imposed by
rule 4(f) with those imposed by rule 4(e), relating to borrowed state long-arm authority. See text
accompanying notes 126-27 supra. As a result, a court may reach the conclusion that the federal rules
require a minimum contacts test of amenability to rule 4(f), as well as rule 4(e), process. Such a
conclusion is, however, clearly contrary to the provisions of rule 4, for rule 4(f), unlike the borrowing
provision of rule 4(e), makes absolutely no mention of state jurisdictional law. Compare text
accompanying note 19 supra with text accompanying note 126 supra.
133. See text accompanying notes 98-103 supra.
134. See text accompanying notes 104-13 supra.
135. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
136. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
137. See text accompanying note 116 supra.
138. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
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present within the bulge and having no other meaningful contacts with
either the bulge or the forum state. 39 The court, while indicating that it
would be fundamentally unfair to exercise jurisdiction over such a
party, 40 gave no detailed rationale for this assertion. Since absent the
100-mile limitation on bulge process imposed by the federal rules, a federal
court could, at least under the Constitution, effect personal jurisdiction
over such a party if found anywhere within the territory of the United
States, there does not appear to be any basis of support for this aspect of
Sprow. Rather, it would seem that a federal court can reach any rule 14 or
rule 19 party found within the bulge, regardless of the absence of other
contacts. Aside from this disagreement with the due process analysis of
Sprow, however, this Case Comment adheres to the views of the opinion
and, as will be set forth, believes that a Sprow standard should be univer-
sally adopted to govern rule 4(f) bulge service of process.
C. The Mandates of the Erie-York Doctrine
In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,'41 the Supreme Court announced the
rule that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State. . . . Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a State. . . .And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts."'' 42 By this broad
mandate, the federal courts cannot shape a substantive body of federal
common law in areas traditionally subject to definition by state legislative
or judicial power. 143 Accordingly, a federal diversity court, which under
the Erie- York doctrine is considered to be acting essentially as another
court of the state in which it is held, 144 is to apply the substantive law of that
state in order to avoid the evils, as recognized by Erie, of forum-
shopping. 45 Conversely, a federal court is to apply, at least in theory,
federal procedure. 46 Due to the difficulty that may arise in attempting to
distinguish between substance and procedure (i.e. the twilight zone),
however, the Erie rule was substantially refined in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York 147 to hold that state procedural law is substantive for the purposes of
Erie, and must be followed by a federal diversity court, if disregard of the
state procedure would substantially affect the outcome of the litigation.
48
139. 594 F.2d at 416. See also note 70 supra.
140. 594 F.2d at 416.
141. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
142. Id. at 78.
143. Id.
144. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 187 (1947); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99,109
(1945).
145. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. at 109.
146. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
147. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
148. Id. at 108-09.
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If the York outcome-determinative test is applied to its literal
extreme, very few of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would have any
effect in a federal court action in which subject-matter jurisdiction is
grounded on diversity of citizenship. 149 As a result, two exceptions have
been carved out of the Erie-York doctrine as applied to procedural
matters. First, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.,150
the Court held that when a state procedural rule is merely one of form and
mode not bound up with state-created rights and obligations, a federal
diversity court may forego the state rule in favor of federal procedure if the
federal procedure is supported by countervailing federal policy con-
siderations of sufficient import to outweigh the general policy of Erie- York
that state law apply.' 5' Second, in Hanna v. Plumer, 5 2 the Court held that
when an issue is expressly governed by a validly enacted Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure, as tested by the dictates of the Rules Enabling Act, 53 then
the federal rule is to be applied regardless of whether a parallel state
procedure is outcome-determinative and bound up with state-created
rights and obligations.
5 4
In the context of the twilight zone question of amenability to suit in a
federal diversity court, many, although not all, of the federal courts that
have considered the question have found the appropriate test is of an
outcome-determinative nature and that the Erie- York doctrine compels, at
least in part, application of a standard based upon state law.1
55
VI. THE ORIGINAL TWILIGHT ZONE: THE FEDERAL STANDARD-
STATE STANDARD CONTROVERSY AND AMENABILITY TO
SUIT OF AN ORIGINAL PARTY DEFENDANT
A. Advocating a Federal Standard:
Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc.
56
Given the constraints of due process and the Erie- York doctrine,
57
the court in Jaftex was faced with the issue whether a foreign corporate
defendant could be amenable to suit in a federal diversity court even
though it was not subject to the jurisdictional reach of the state courts of
the state in which the federal court was held. The court, speaking through
149. C. WRIGHT, supra note 10, § 55, at 256-57.
150. 356 U.S. 525 (1957).
151. Id. at 536-38. See also Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60,63-64 (4th Cir. 1965).
152. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See also Note, Erie-York Doctrine Does Not Govern Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 345 (1966).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976) ("Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right .. "). See also Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
154. 380 U.S. at 469-70.
155. See text accompanying notes 156-85 infra.
156. 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960), overruled, Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219,225
(2d Cir. 1963). See also note 127 supra.
157. The Hanna refinement of the Erie-York doctrine had not been developed at the time of
Jaftex.
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the late Judge Clark, drafter of the federal rules, concluded that "the
question whether a foreign corporation is present in a district to permit
service of process upon it is one of federal law governing the procedure of
the United States courts ... ,,158 The court recognized the argument that
the Erie- York doctrine may require a test based upon state law,159 but
rejected it, finding that either the issue was outside the scope of Erie, 60 or,
if within Erie's coverage, subject to a Byrd "countervailing federal policy
considerations" exception to Erie.161 The Jaftex court, while appearing to
engage in a Byrd balancing analysis, found support for a federal policy
favoring a federal test of amenability to process in federal venue, 62 and
service statutes, 163 in the statute creating the lower federal courts,164 and in
the view that the essence of federal diversity jurisdiction as created by
article III of the Constitution is that citizens of different states are "entitled
to the essentials of a trial according to federal standards.' ' 65 Although the
Jaftex decision is a complicated inquiry into the constitutional and
statutory bases of the federal judicial system, as interpreted by both the
legislature and the courts, 66 the crux of the opinion is that a nonresident
defendant's amenability to suit in a federal diversity court is to be tested by
a standard based solely on federal law.
67
B. Advocating a State Standard:
Arrowsmith v. United Press International
6
The federal standard of amenability to service of process upon a non-
resident, original party defendant to a diversity action announced in
Jaftex169 was short-lived, for it was expressly overruled three years later by
the Second Circuit, sitting en banc and speaking through Judge Friendly,
in Arrowsmith170 The court held that the appropriate standard of
amenability to suit in a diversity action is to be determined by reference to
"the law of the state where the [federal] court sits, with 'federal law'
entering the picture only for the purpose of deciding whether a state's
assertion of jurisdiction contravenes a constitutional guarantee.' 7 ' The
158. 282 F.2d at 516 (emphasis in original).
159. Id. at 512.
160. Id. at 513.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 512, referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
163. 282 F.2d at 512; 28 U.S.C. § 1693.
164. 282 F.2d at 516.
165. Id. at 513.
166. Id. at 516. Judge Clark noted that judicial interpretations of federal policy are of as much
significance and precedential value as legislative declarations thereof.
167. Id.; Note, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1662 (1961); Note, Corporate Amenability to Service of
Process-Federal Law Applicable to Determine Corporate Presence, 6 VILL. L. REV. 404 (1961).
168. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
169. See text accompanying notes 156-67 supra.
170. 320 F.2d at 225.
171. Id. at 223.
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Arrowsmith court conceded that the Erie- York doctrine "would not
prevent Congress or its rule-making delegate from authorizing a [federal]
district court to assume jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in an
ordinary diversity case although the [parallel] state court would not.'"' 72
The court, however, could find no such congressional authorization in
either the concept of federal diversity jurisdiction 173 or the federal statutes
and rules relied on by Jaftext74 sufficient to outweigh a state's valid interest
in the enforcement of its laws. 75 Moreover, the Arrowsmith court noted
that it would find no such federal policy favoring a federal test of
amenability to suit in a diversity action "in the absence of direction by
federal statute or rule."' 76 By this statement, the Arrowsmith court
apparently meant that any federal standard of amenability must be
supported by an express congressional dictate.
The Arrowsmith analysis of the federal standard-state standard
controversy is significant because it appears to apply a Byrd balancing
approach to the Erie- York problems inherent in the issue, as did the Jaftex
court. 177 As a result, even though Arrowsmith held that state law is to
control the issue in the context of the amenability to suit of an original
party defendant, a federal standard of amenability would not be precluded
if an express legislative policy favoring such a test could be found.
178
Although the Arrowsmith holding has been followed by all other
circuit courts of appeals, 179 and appears to be consistent with the general
principles governing a federal court's utilization of borrowed state long-
arm authority under federal rule 4(e), 80 the court in Arrowsmith may not
have needed to reach the federal-state standard of amenability issue. In
Arrowsmith, process was served on the nonresident defendant's sole
employee in the state in which the action was brought.'' After holding that
state, rather than federal, law must control, the court indicated that the
defendant would not be subject to suit under the long-arm statute of the
state in which the federal district court sat because of insufficient contacts
between the forum state and the defendant. 82 It appears, however, that the
court should have initially addressed the issue whether the employee upon
whom service was made was an "agent" of the defendant for the purpose of
172. Id. at 226.
173. Id. at 226, 227 and 230.
174. Id. at 225-28.
175. Id. at 226.
176. Id.
177. Although Arrowsmith discounted as irrelevant Jaftex's reliance on the Byrd case the court
later indicated that a Byrd balancing analysis was being applied, stating that the court was "aware of no
federal policy of similar strength or constitutional basis [as that in Byrd] that would justify disregard of
state laws as to when a foreign corporation may be held to answer in a suit like the present." Id. at 230.
178. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 1075, at 306.
179. Id. at 309; C. WRIGHT, supra note 10, § 64, at 304. See cases cited in note 10 supra.
180. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
181. 320 F.2d at 222.
182. Id. at 232-34.
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service within the state. Resolution of this question hinges exclusively
upon federal law.'83 Had the court considered this agency issue, it would
have been unnecessary to reach the questions ultimately decided by
Arrowsmith. Nevertheless, the Arrowsmith position is currently favored
by both the majority of federal courts 84 and the American Law Insti-
tute. 
185
C. The Supreme Court's Position on the Original Twilight Zone
The Supreme Court has not recently addressed the question whether
state or federal law is to control amenability to service. The 1898 case of
Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane1 86 appears to stand for the proposition that
a foreign corporation is amenable to suit in a federal diversity court even
though the parallel state court cannot entertain the action.'87 As a result, it
is fairly arguable that Barrow supports a federal test of amenability to
service of process, 188 although the decision has been distinguished on the
ground that it dealt only with the applicability of a state door-closing
statute, 189 and has been criticized as without an adequate explanation for
its apparent holding.1 90
Some commentators have expressed the belief that the decision in
National Equipment Rental, Inc. v. Szukhent' 9' indicates that the Su-
preme Court would approve a federal test of amenability to suit. 192 In
Szukhent, the Court held that the word "agent" in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(1) is to be interpreted as embodying a federal test of the
validity of service of process issued by a federal court.' 93 The Szukhent
opinion, however, can be limited to a very narrow decision on an express
provision of the federal rules relating to the manner of federal service of
process and, as a result, may not apply to the more abstract and general
concept of federal in personamjurisdiction.194
Accordingly, until the Supreme Court directly addresses the issue of
the appropriate test of amenability to service of federal process, it appears
that the various courts of appeals decisions must be considered
183. National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1964).
184. See cases cited in note 10 supra.
185. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 133-34 (1968) (hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY). See also ALI STUDY, TENTATIVE
DRAFT NO. 2 § 1303 and Commentary at77-79 (1964); ALI STUDY, TENTATIVEDRAFT NO. I § 1303 and
Commentary at 54-56 (1963).
186. 170 U.S. 100 (1898).
187. Id. at 110-12.
188. See Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d at 514.
189. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d at 229.
190. Id.
191. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
192. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 10, § 64, at 304; 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 1075, at
310 n.51; D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS-CASES AND MATERIALS 837 (2d ed. 1975); F. JAMES, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 654 (1965).
193. 375 U.S. at 316-17.
194. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 1075, at 310 n.51.
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controlling.1 95 In the context of the original twilight zone, this means that
the amenability to suit of an original party nonresident defendant to a
federal diversity action will be tested by a standard based upon the law of
the state in which the federal court is held. 1
96
VII. THE NEw TWILIGHT ZONE: THE FEDERAL STANDARD-
STATE STANDARD CONTROVERSY AND AMENABILITY
TO FEDERAL RULE 4(f) BULGE PROCESS
A. Introduction: Twilight Zones Oldand New
The original twilight zone, discussed in the previous section, dealt
with the issue of amenability to suit in the context of an original party
defendant to a federal diversity action. By contrast, the new twilight zone
raises the question, addressed by Sprow, 97 whether the amenability to suit
of a party served with federal rule 4(f) bulge process is to be determined by
a federal standard based solely on constitutional considerations of due
process, or by a standard grounded on state jurisdictional law. In addition
to the constitutional standard announced in Sprow, other courts, many of
which appear to have followed the rationale of Arrowsmith, have adopted
a test based on either the law of the forum state or the law of the state in
which bulge service is made. Moreover, although other decisions have
claimed to follow a state law standard of amenability to bulge service of
process, it is arguable that they have, at least in part, applied a federal test.
In analyzing these conflicting approaches to the new twilight zone,
this Case Comment will scrutinize each in light of the law applied and,
when possible, in light of the achievement of the policies of bulge process
and the effectiveness of each test in a factual pattern analagous to that
presented by the Sprow case.
B. The Forum State Standard ofAmenability to Bulge Process
The minimum contacts doctrine mandates that before a court
exercises personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the
defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum. 98 On this basis,
the argument can be made that the Sprow constitutional standard of
amenability to bulge process-or any similar test that measures a non-
resident's amenability by reference to the expanded bulge jurisdiction of
the court-contravenes the minimum contacts doctrine because such a test
allows the court to assertjurisdiction over the party served if such party has
sufficient contacts with the extraterritorial bulge area, without regard to
whether the party has any contacts with the forum state. 199
195. See cases cited in note 10 supra.
196. E.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
197. See text accompanying notes 49-81 supra.
198. See text accompanying notes 89-97 supra.
199. Such a result is clearly possible under the Sprow standard. See 594 F.2d at 415-16.
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Facially, this argument militates against a Sprow-type standard on
the ground that such a test permits the assertion of personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident who may have no contacts whatsoever with the forum
state. Indeed, a minority of the courts that have addressed the amenability
to bulge process issue have embraced this rationale,20 0 reaching the
conclusion that due process requires that the jurisdictional law of the state
in which the federal court is held (i.e. the forum state) govern, because of
the necessity for "certain minimal contacts with the forum in order to
subject a defendant to in personam jurisdiction. 2 0 ' Under this forum state
standard, a nonresident is amenable to rule 4(f) bulge process only if he
falls within the parameters of the bulge provision,20 2 has contacts with the
forum sufficient to satisfy the International Shoe minimum contacts
doctrine,0 3 and, when the forum state legislature has chosen to limit the
scope of its reach over nonresident litigants, has contacts with the forum
state sufficient to satisfy the state long-arm statute.20 4
In addition to its conceptual underpinnings in the International Shoe
minimum contacts doctrine, the forum state standard also claims support
in the premise-concurred in by the state-of-service standard courts2 5-
that rule 4(f) does not establish an independent basis for a federal court's
jurisdiction but rather relates only to the manner and scope of service of
federal process.20 6
There can be no doubt that the constraints of due process apply to
bulge service of process. This was expressly recognized by the court in
Sprow. 20 7 The answer to the facially appealing assertion of the forum state
standard advocates that the International Shoe minimum contacts
doctrine precludes application of a Sprow constitutional standard of
amenability to bulge process-or of any other test that allows judicial
jurisdiction to be exercised solely on the basis of contacts with the bulge
area-is twofold.
First, the minimum contacts doctrine of International Shoe is an
extension of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and thus
is applicable only to a state court's assertion of in personam jurisdiction. 208
The only instance in which the International Shoe minimum contacts
200. Karlsen v. Hanff, 278 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Deloro Smelting& Ref. Co. v.
Engelhard Minerals & Chem. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 470, 475-77 (D. N.J. 1970).
201. Karlsen v. Hanff, 278 F. Supp. at 865 (emphasis added).
202. See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
203. Karlsen v. Hanff, 278 F. Supp. at 865.
204. The court in Karlsen v. Hanff, 278 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), did not discuss this aspect
of the forum state standard. The claim has, however, been raised in the cases by parties seeking to avoid
the jurisdiction of the court. See, e.g., Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d at 416; Coleman v.
American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d at 25 1; Pillsbury Co. v. Delta Boat & Barge Rental,
Inc., 72 F.R.D. at 631-32.
205. See, e.g., Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d at 253.
206. Karlsen v. Hanff, 278 F. Supp. at 865.
207. 594 F.2d at 415.
208. See text accompanying notes 98-102 supra.
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doctrine is relevant to a federal court's exercise of personal jurisdiction is
when the court is employing borrowed state long-arm authority pursuant
to federal rule 4(e). 20 9 The due process constraints on a federal court
effecting rule 4(f) bulge service of process are those of the fifth
amendment,210 which permit nationwide in personam jurisdiction, 21 and
the limitations upon effective service found in the grant of extraterritorial
bulge jurisdiction,212 which limit bulge process to within 100 miles of the
federal courthouse.2 3 As a result, the International Shoe minimum
contacts doctrine has no relevance under either the Constitution or the
federal rules to rule 4(f) bulge service of process.
Second, a nonresident's nexus is measured in relation to the forum.21 4
In the case of rule 4(f) bulge process, the forum-for the purposes of
defining the scope of the jurisdictional reach of the court issuing process-
is determined not by reference to the traditional concept of state
geographic boundaries, but rather by the expanded 100 mile limit
imposed by rule 4(f).2 15 Thus, in the instance of bulge service of process,
the forum is comprised of the state in which the federal courts sits and the
bulge area created by the 100 mile extension. It is in relation to this
expanded federal forum that the contacts of a party served with bulge
process are to be measured. In such a context, the notion of territorial
forum jurisdiction defined by state geographic boundaries is irrelevant.
This concept of an expanded federal forum is merely reflective of the fact
that rule 4(f)'s bulge provision is a valid enlargement of a federal district
court's territorial jurisdiction pursuant to the congressional power to
provide for extraterritorial, and even nationwide, service of federal
process.21 6 Therefore, there can be no persuasive due process objection to
measurement of the contacts of a party served with bulge process by
reference to the expanded jurisdictional reach of a federal court acting
pursuant to rule 4(f).
Under a forum state standard, the Sprow court could not have
obtained personal jurisdiction over the third-party defendants Breseman
and Frazier because of their near total lack of contacts with the forum
state, Louisiana.217 As a result, defendant Hartford, in order to litigate its
claim against the third-party defendants, would be forced to bring a
separate action against them, presumably in Mississippi where personal
209. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
210. See text accompanying notes 104-13 supra.
211. Id.
212. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
213. See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
214. See text accompanying notes 104-06 supra.
215. Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d at 415; Pillsbury Co. v. Delta Boat & Barge Rental,
Inc., 72 F.R.D. at 632; Kaplan, supra note 19, at 633.
216. Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. at 442-43; 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 10, § 1127, at 533.
217. See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
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jurisdiction over Breseman and Frazier clearly existed. 218 Although some
jurisdictions have indicated that it is better policy to require actions
between co-defendants and/or third-party defendants to be litigated
separately, 219 such a rule, and the result that would obtain if a forum state
standard were employed in a factual pattern similar to that presented by
Sprow, are clearly contrary to the policy of rule 4(f) to maximize
determination of entire controversies in one judicial proceeding.220
The forum state standard has been severely criticized, both by later
cases221 and by the commentators.222 This standard, in effect, hinges the
reach of rule 4(f) bulge process on the forum state legislature's choice as to
the scope of its long-arm jurisdiction. Since a state need not extend its
long-arm authority to the constitutionally permitted limits, 223 maximum
effectuation of the rule 4(f) policy of resolution of entire controversies is
made contingent upon state policy choices-a result clearly not
contemplated by the drafters of rule 4(f),224 who intended the bulge
provision to operate independent of and without regard to the juris-
dictional principles of the state in which the federal court is held. 2 5 Bulge
service of process was intended to serve as a mechanism enabling federal
courts to adjudicate controversies which parallel state judicial systems do
not or cannot accommodate.226 By conditioning the scope of federal bulge
process on state policy choices, the very purpose of the provision is
defeated.
Moreover, to require that a nonresident defendant be amenable to
forum long-arm jurisdiction before such defendant can be reached with
bulge process totally destroys the effectiveness of the 100-mile provision by
reducing it to nothing more than a second means to serve process on a
party already subject to the jurisdiction of the court through a
combination of minimum forum contacts and rule 4(e) borrowed state
long-arm authority. 7 It seems highly illogical and inconsistent with the
integrity and purposes of the federal rules to construe a validly enacted
provision to have no effect other than one which could already be realized
218. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
219. E.g., Liebhauser v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 180 Wis. 468, 193 N.W. 522 (1923).
220. See text accompanying notes 31-48 supra.
221. Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d at 417; Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen
Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d at 251-52; Pillsbury Co. v. Delta Boat & Barge Rental, Inc., 72 F.R.D. at 632;
Pierce v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 49 F.R.D. at 66 n.3. Although Coleman did not expressly
overrule Karlsen, it recognized that Karlsen was analagous to the district court opinion reversed by
Coleman. 405 F.2d at 251.
222. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 1075, at 314-15, § 1127, at 534-35; 2 MooRE, supra
note 10, § 4.42(2), at 538 n.2; Kaplan, supra note 19, at 630-31.
223. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. at 440,446; Pulson v. American Rolling
Mill Co., 170 F.2d at 194.
224. See text accompanying notes 31-48 supra.
225. Vestal, supra note 19, at 1060-61.
226. Kaplan, supra note 19, at 632.
227. Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d at 417; Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen
Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d at 251-52; 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 1075, at 314, and § 1127, at 535.
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under existing authority.228 Clearly, the drafters of rule 4(f) intended the
bulge provision to accomplish more than a mere imitation of the other
provisions of rule 4 relating to a federal court's authority to exert personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents. A forum state standard of amenability,
however, places just such a meaningless interpretation on the bulge service
of process provision. For these reasons, the forum state standard should
no longer be followed.
C. The State-of-Service Standard of Amenability
to Bulge Process
In Arrowsmith, the Second Circuit expressly left open the question of
the standard to be utilized in determining a nonresident defendant's
amenability to suit when process is served pursuant to the bulge provision
of federal rule 4(f). 229 The court resolved this issue in Coleman v. American
Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. ,230 holding that "process can be validly
served in another state within the 'bulge' created by rule 4(f) only on
persons over whom that state has jurisdiction and, very likely, only on
persons over whom [the state in which service is made] has chosen to
exercise [jurisdiction]., 23 This "bulge state' ' 2 2 or "state of service"
standard of amenability to federal rule 4(f) bulge process is, like the forum
state standard, predicated on the assumption that rule 4(f) relates only to
the manner and scope of extraterritorial service of federal process, but
does not speak to the issue of when the party served is subject to the
233 bfrjurisdiction of the court. Thus, before bulge process can be effected
under the Coleman standard, it must be determined not only that the party
to be served falls within the parameters of rule 4(f)'s bulge provision 234 and
is present within the bulge, but also that such party is amenable to suit in
the courts of the state in which bulge service is made.235 In order to fulfill
this latter aspect of the Coleman state-of-service test, the party to be served
must either be a resident of the state of service,236 or, if a nonresident, have
contacts with the state of service sufficient to satisfy both the due process
mandates of the International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine and the
requirements of the state of service long-arm statute237-which may or
may not extend to the constitutional limits.
238
228. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), (f).
229. 320 F.2d at 228 n.9.
230. 405 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1968).
231. 405 F.2d at 252.
232. "The 'bulge' state is the state where the third-party defendant is served and which is not the
forum state." Spearing v. Manhattan Oil Transp. Corp., 375 F. Supp. at 764 n.10.
233. Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d at 253.
234. See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
235. 405 F.2d at 252.
236. In Coleman, the party served with bulge process was a resident of the state of service. Id. at
251.
237. See text accompanying notes 89-97 supra.
238. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. at 440,446; Pulson v. American Rolling
Mill Co., 170 F.2d at 194.
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In Coleman, plaintiff brought suit in the Southern District of New
York on a federal claim for relief arising in Hoboken, New Jersey.239
Defendant American Export brought a third-party action for indemnifica-
tion under federal rule 14(a) against Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc.
(Atlantic), a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal office and place
240of business in Philadelphia, but doing no business in New York. Process
was served upon Atlantic at its Philadelphia office pursuant to rule 4(f)'s
bulge provision.24 The district court granted Atlantic's motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction on the basis that Atlantic did not have
sufficient contacts with New York to allow the court to assert juris-
diction. 42 In reversing the district court and announcing the state of
service standard, the Second Circuit stated that "[t]here can be no doubt
whatever that Pennsylvania can and does provide that a Pennsylvania
corporation with its principal office in Pennsylvania and doing business
there can be validly served at its headquarters in Philadelphia.2 43
By this express reference to the jurisdictional law of the state in which
bulge service was made, Pennsylvania, it is clear that the Coleman
standard of amenability places prime emphasis on whether or not the party
served is amenable to suit in the courts of the state of service, without
regard to whether such party has a sufficient relationship with the forum
state to allow assertion of borrowed forum state long-arm jurisdiction.4
In this regard, the Coleman state-of-service test is more closely aligned
with the Sprow constitutional standard than with the forum-state test, in
that both Coleman and Sprow measure the amenability of a party served
with bulge process by reference to that party's relationship with the
expanded bulge jurisdiction of the federal court. Unlike Sprow, however,
Coleman conditions the availability of bulge service of federal process on
state law.
In the factual pattern presented by the Sprow case,245 it is unclear
whether the court could have obtained jurisdiction over the persons of the
third-party defendants had the court applied a Coleman state-of-service
test of amenability, primarily because the Sprow court made no mention of
the law of the state in which bulge service was made, Mississippi. 246
247Because the third-party defendants were residents of the state of service,
however, it can fairly be assumed that they would have been amenable to
239. 405 F.2d at 251.
240. Id.
241. Id. Philadelphia is within 100 miles of the Southern District of New York federal
courthouse.
242. Id. The district court employed a forum state standard of amenability to bulge process. See
note 221 supra.
243. 405 F.2d at 252, citing 12 P.S. App. R.C.P. Nos. 2179 and 2180.
244. 405 F.2d at 251-52.
245. See text accompanying notes 49-61 supra.
246. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
247. 594 F.2d at 414.
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suit there, such that a Coleman standard would have allowed the Sprow
court to reach the third-party defendants. 248 As a result, the outcome of the
Sprow case would likely have been the same under either a constitutional
standard or a state-of-service standard.
Circumstances may arise, however, in which a state-of-service test of
amenability would be ineffective to allow a federal court to reach a party
sought through bulge service of process.24 9 When the party sought is a
nonresident of both the forum state and the state of service, the court's
power to reach the defendant will hinge upon the long-arm authority of the
state of service. If the long-arm jurisdiction of that state extends to the
constitutional limits permitted by International Shoe, then the court will
be able to reach the party sought regardless of the test of amenability used.
But when the state of service has, for policy reasons, chosen to limit
the scope of its long-arm jurisdiction to a point at which the party sought to
be served with bulge process could not be reached by the courts of that
state, a Coleman standard of amenability will prove ineffective even
though the party sought may have a nexus with the bulge area sufficient to
satisfy the minimum contacts doctrine of International Shoe. In such a
case, only a standard of amenability based solely on constitutional
principles and the express limitations of rule 4(f), without regard to state
law, will allow the court to obtain jurisdiction over the party sought. This,
in essence, means application of a Sprow test of amenability. Given the
strong policy of the federal rules in general, and rule 4(f) in particular,
favoring resolution of entire controversies in onejudical proceeding, 250 it is
clear that a Sprow-type standard of amenability to bulge process-
grounded exclusively on the constitutional limits of the fifth amendment
and the legislative limits on bulge process imposed by the grant of
extraterritorial bulge power, without restraint by state jurisdictional law-
is of much greater practical value than a test based upon state law. Only a
federal standard will allow realization of the policies supporting rule 4(f)
bulge service of process in the greatest number and variety of cir-
cumstances.
The Coleman state-of-service standard, and the cases following it,
25
'
are clearly attempting to further the bulge process goal of determination of
entire controversies by freeing bulge service from the necessity of a nexus
between the party served and the forum state sufficient to permit the forum
to assert state long-arm jurisdiction.252 As stated in Coleman, "if the [bulge
248. See text accompanying notes 234-38 supra.
249. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 1127, at 534-35.
250. See text accompanying notes 31-48 supra.
251. Spearing v. Manhattan Oil Trans. Co., 375 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Pillsbury Co. v.
Delta Boat & Barge Rental, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 630 (E.D. La. 1976); Pierce v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc.,
49 F.R.D. 63(D. Md. 1969); McGoniglev. Penn-CentralTransp. Co.,49 F.R.D. 58(D. Md. 1969). See
generally School Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Mo. 1978); R. Clinton Const. Co. v. Bryant
& Reaves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Miss. 1977).
252. 405 F.2d at 252 n.2.
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service of process] amendment had done no more than [simply allowed
service outside the state where the court is sitting with respect to persons
already subject to the jurisdiction of that state] it would have accomplished
little.,,253 To the extent that the state-of-service standard achieves the rule
4(f) policies, it is laudable.
The rationale for the Coleman decision, however, is unclear and the
holding is without adequate explanation. The Coleman court appears to
claim that state law must be relied upon to determine amenability to
service of process not only because of the possible constraints of the Erie-
York doctrine,254 but also because rule 4(f) does not provide an
independent basis for a federal court's assertion of personaljurisdiction.2
This premise may be an incorrect interpretation of rule 4(f). The Notes
of the Advisory Committee on Rule 4(f) state that "any requirements of
subject-matter jurisdiction and venue will still have to be satisfied as to the
parties brought in" by bulge service of process. 256 A plain reading of this
comment would seem to indicate that the drafters of rule 4(f) believed that
the bulge provision supplied grounds for federal in personam jurisdiction
and merely omitted an independent basis for the remaining requisites of
federal judicial action-venue and subject-matter jurisdiction. A literal
reading of the bulge provision also supports this conclusion. At least one
commentator has stated that rule 4(f) bulge service of process is a means, in
and of itself, to obtain personal jurisdiction over persons within its
257
coverage. This result appears more consistent with the language of rule
4(f) and the Notes of the Advisory Committee, and it appears to refute the
claim-made by Coleman-that the bulge provision relates only to the
manner and scope of service of federal process, not to amenability.
Coleman can also be faulted for introducing state law principles of
jurisdiction and fourteenth amendment International Shoe due process
considerations into a federal scheme in which they have no relevance.2
Federal in personam jurisdiction is subject to fourteenth amendment due
process only when the federal court is borrowing state long-arm authority
under rule 4(e).259 Absent such circumstances, the due process constraints
on the federal courts are determined solely by reference to the fifth
amendment and to any legislative limitations placed by statute or rule on
the lower federal courts.260
Moreover, given the close similarity of the issues presented by the
Coleman and Arrowsmith cases, it would seem that, on the basis of
253. Id. at 251-52.
254. Id. See also Pillsbury Co. v. Delta Boat & Barge Rental, Inc., 72 F.R.D. at 632.
255. 405 F.2d at 253.
256. Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 31, at 629.
257. Vestal, supra note 19, at 1061 n.45. See also Foster, supra note 124, at 98-99, 100-02.
258. See text accompanying notes 279-315 infra.
259. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
260. Id.
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precedent, Coleman should follow Arrowsmith in requiring that a
standard of amenability to suit be determined solely by "the law of the state
where the [federal] court sits. '261 Although Coleman cites Arrowsmith as
precedent, 62 it does not appear to subscribe to the Arrowsmith rationale.
And even though a Coleman state-of-service standard more effectively
affords realization of the policy goals of rule 4(f) than would a forum state
standard apparently dictated by a literal reading of Arrowsmith, Coleman
fails to distinguish Arrowsmith, does not address the underlying Erie- York
problems so thoroughly discussed by Arrowsmith, and offers absolutely
no explanation for its holding that rule 4(f) bulge process can be served
validly only if the law of the state in which bulge service is made so allows.
As a result of these unanswered issues and the fact that situations may arise
in which the purposes of bulge service of process would be thwarted by
application of a state-of-service standard,263 the Coleman test is sus-
ceptible to criticism as illogical, 264 without an adequate rationale, and-in
light of the effectiveness with which a constitutional standard of
amenability to bulge process attains the goals of rule 4(f)265 -as an
inefficient attempt to achieve its stated purpose of furthering the ease of
adjudicating complicated controversies. For these reasons, the state-of-
service standard of amenability to rule 4(f) bulge service of process is
unacceptable.
D. Towards a Federal Standard:
Cases with an Equivocal Federal Test
In three opinions, McGonigle v. Penn-Central Transportation Co.,
266
Pierce v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc.,2 67 and Pillsbury Co. v. Delta Boat
& Barge Rental, Inc., 268 there are indications of the development of a
federal test of amenability to bulge process, although the exact holdings of269
these cases are uncertain. In McGonigle, in which the action was based
on a federally created cause of action,270 the court appeared to hold that
261. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d at 223. See also 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
10, § 1127, at 535 ("The holding ofArrowsmith ... seem[s]torequiretheapplicationofforumlaw.")
But see 2 MOORE, supra note 10, § 4.42(2), at 538 ("While the holding of Arrowsmith ... continues to
be followed, the amenability of a foreign corporation to [bulge] service of process is determined by the
law of the state where service is made.").
262. 405 F.2d at 252-53.
263. See text accompanying notes 245-50 supra.
264. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 1127, at 535 ("Service under the law of the state of
service ... seems illogical. Of what relevance is the fact that defendant is amenable to process in a
particular area of New Jersey when the action is lodged in the Southern District of New YorkT).
265. See text accompanying notes 245-50 supra.
266. 49 F.R.D. 58 (D. Md. 1969).
267. 49 F.R.D. 63 (D. Md. 1969).
268. 72 F.R.D. 630 (E.D. La. 1976).
269. See Lee v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 445 F. Supp. 189, 193-94 (D. Del. 1978), in which the court
recognized the controversy surrounding the appropriate standard of amenability to bulge process, but
refused to decide the issue, holding instead that the party sought was amenable under all of the tests
previously set forth in the cases.
270. 49 F.R.D. at 59.
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personal jurisdiction over a third-party defendant can be obtained
pursuant to federal rule 4(f) bulge service of process if the party served has
a sufficient nexus with the bulge area, this nexus being determined in light
of the minimum contacts doctrine of International Shoe.271 The court also
noted, however, that the party served was amenable to suit in the state of
service, under that state's laws, and that the state of service had chosen to
exercise jurisdiction over the class of persons to which the party served
belonged. 272 Because of this express reference to the Coleman state-of-
service standard, it is unclear whether McGonigle is espousing a federal or
a state standard of amenability. Moreover, in Pierce, in which diversity of
citizenship formed the basis of the original action,273 the court relied
heavily not only on its earlier decision in McGonigle,274 but also on a
Coleman state of service analysis. 75 Pillsbury,76 like McGonigle and
Pierce, similarly claims to have embraced Coleman,a77 although the court
made no reference to the law of the state in which bulge service was made.
As a result of this lack of clarity regarding which standard is being
applied, the most that can be said of these opinions is that they may
indicate a willingness to adopt a federal standard of amenability to bulge
process, at least when the original action is grounded on a federally created
right.2 78 In light of the ambiguity of these decisions, evaluating them in
terms of the policies of rule 4(f) and a Sprow factual pattern would be
futile.
VIII. INTO THE TWILIGHT ZONE: FITTING A CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARD OF AMENABILITY TO BULGE PROCESS INTO
THE Erie- York Doctrine
A. Introduction: In the Shadow of Erie
Having concluded that neither considerations of constitutional due
process nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a state law test of
amenability to bulge process, and that a Sprow constitutional standard is
of much greater practical value than those tests previously applied, the
remaining inquiry focuses on the most serious obstacle to a federal
standard of amenability to bulge process and the very heart of the twilight
271. 49 F.R.D. at 62-63. The court relied on the standard developed by Kaplan, supra note 19, at
633. See also note 67 supra.
272. 49 F.R.D. at 63 n.6.
273. Id. at 64.
274. 49 F.R.D. at 66-67.
275. Id.
276. Pillsbury did not indicate whether the action was based on diversity or a federally-created
claim for relief.
277. 72 F.R.D. at 632.
278. In Pierce, the court noted that different tests of amenability may apply depending upon
whether the action is grounded on diversity of citizenship or a federal right. The court, however,
discussed the issue only in the context of a forum state standard of amenability, which it rejected. 49
F.R.D. at 66.
[Vol. 41:685
RULE 4(f) BULGE SERVICE OF PROCESS
zone-whether the Erie- York doctrine requires that amenability to rule
4(f) bulge service of process be determined by a standard based upon state
law.
The necessity of addressing this Erie- York problem arises from the
original twilight zone represented by the Jaftex-Arrowsmith controver-
sy. 279 Both Jaftex and Arrowsmith focused on the applicable test of
amenability in light of the Erie- York doctrine, 280 and Arrowsmith relied, at
least in part, on Erie in reaching its holding that state law is to govern the
amenability to suit of an original party defendant to a federal diversity
action. 281  Moreover, Coleman, which adopted the state-of-service
standard of amenability to bulge process, 28 2 was decided by the same court
as Arrowsmith, and Coleman cites Arrowsmith as authority for its holding
that state law controls. 283 This, at least arguably, casts the shadow of the
Erie- York doctrine onto the issue of amenability to suit under the federal
rule 4(f) bulge service of process provision.
B. The Apparent Effect of the Erie-York Doctrine
If the issue of the appropriate standard of amenability to bulge service
of process is considered to be one of substantive law, then Erie-with its
dictate that federal diversity courts284 follow state substantive law and
policy as closely as practicable-clearly demands a standard based upon
state law. 285 As this Case Comment has suggested throughout, however,
the question falls into the indistinct twilight zone between substance and
procedure, such that whether federal or state law controls hinges upon an
analysis of the York outcome-determinative test, the Byrd doctrine of
countervailing federal policy considerations, and the Hanna exception to
Erie.
286
When the issue has related to the amenability to suit of an original
party defendant to a diversity action, as in Jaftex and Arrowsmith,287 the
279. See text accompanying notes 156-85 supra.
280. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d at 226; Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282
F.2d at 512-13.
281. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d at 226.
282. See text accompanying notes 229-44 supra.
283. Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d at 2.
284. The Erie-York doctrine does not apply to actions based on the Constitution, Acts of
Congress, or treaties of the United States. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The law is
well-settled that, in a suit in federal court based on a federally created right, amenability to process is
determined solely by reference to federal law. Fralely v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 397 F.2d 1, 3-4 (3d Cir.
1968); Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954); C. WRIGHT,
supra note 10, § 64, at 303; 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 1075, at 302. See also Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962); United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
But see Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546, 548-49 (4th Cir. 1965).
285. See text accompanying notes 141-55 supra.
286. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 78. One commentator, however, has suggested that a
federal court may forego state substantive, as well as procedural, law under the Byrd doctrine of
countervailing federal policy considerations. Vestal, Erie Railroad v. Tompkins: A Projection, 48
IoWA L. REV. 248, 268-69 (1963).
287. See text accompanying notes 156-85 supra.
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courts have generally agreed that the amenability standard issue is
outcome-determinative. 88 Moreover, the majority of courts have not
found any countervailing considerations of federal policy of sufficient
weight to allow application of a federal test. 289 As a result, a test of
amenability based upon state law has generally been required.290
Because of the similarity of the issues presented by the Jaftex-
Arrowsmith cases and the Sprow- Coleman cases, the following discussion
will proceed on the premise, supported at least presumptively by the Erie-
York doctrine, that the standard used to determine amenability to bulge
service of process is also outcome-determinative, such that state
jurisdictional law must control the issue unless a federal standard can be
found permissible either as explicitly mandated by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, favored by countervailing federal policy considerations,
or outside of the contemplation of the Erie- York doctrine.
C. A Constitutional Standard of Amenability to Bulge Process
and the Hanna Exception to the Erie-York Doctrine
When an issue is governed by a validly enacted Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure, a federal diversity court will apply the federal procedure,
regardless of whether a contrary state procedure is outcome-
determinative.2 1 Although rule 4(f) does not, on its face, expressly adopt a
federal standard of amenability to bulge service of process, it is fairly
arguable that such a test is contemplated by the rule.
Rule 4(f) begins by stating that, in general, process issuing from a
federal district court is valid only within the territorial boundaries of the
state in which the federal court sits.29 2 The rule then goes on to create an
exception to this general limitation on the reach of federal process-
namely, that federal process may be served beyond the territorial limits of
the state in which the federal court is held when authorized by a federal
statute or by a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
The bulge service of process provision of rule 4(f) states that it is to be
"in addition" to these authorizations of extraterritorial service.293 This
language indicates that the bulge provision is, in and of itself, an
authorization of extraterritorial federal process in the limited situations to
which bulge process is applicable. As a result, the bulge process provision
of rule 4(f) must be considered the equivalent of such other statutes and
rules recognized by the preceding clause of rule 4(f) as authorizing
extraterritorial service of federal process. 294
288. Annotation, 6 A.L.R.3d 1103, 1124-25 (1966).
289. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d at 225-26.
290. See cases cited in note 10 supra.
291. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-74 (1965). See also text accompanying notes 141-55
supra.
292. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). See text accompanying notes 119-25 supra.
293. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
294. Vestal, supra note 19, at 1061; Kaplan, supra note 19, at 632.
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In the instance of extraterritorial authorization to borrow state
jurisdictional law under rule 4(e), it is clear that amenability to the
extraterritorial federal process should be determined in accordance with
the law of the state whose long-arm authority is utilized. When
extraterritorial process issues solely on the basis of a federal statute or rule,
however, amenability to such process is to be determined under a federal
test.29s In such a case, amenability to process is an issue to be resolved
solely by reference to federal principles of in personam jurisdiction,
without restraint of state law.21
96
The rule 4(f) bulge process provision falls within this latter category of
extraterritorial authority. By the very language of rule 4(f), bulge service of
process-unlike rule 4(e) borrowed state process-operates solely of its
own accord, without looking to state law for its substance. Although no
court has yet interpreted the "in addition" language of rule 4(f) to mean
that the bulge provision is equivalent to federal statutes providing for
nationwide service of federal process, and thus subject to a federal test of
amenability, such a construction is plausible and consistent with the
general scheme of federal rule 4.
Moreover, by its own language, the bulge process provision is limited
to the federal modes of service allowed by rule 4(d)(l)-(6). 297 State methods
of service generally available to the federal courts by rule 4(d)(7) are not
permitted under the bulge provision. This exclusion of state service devices
is indicative of the intent of the drafters of rule 4(f) that bulge service of
process should operate free of the scope of process of the state in which the
federal court is held. 298 It seems incongruous to interpret the bulge
provision as requiring a state law test of amenability when the clear thrust
of the provision is that it should have effect without regard to state law. 9
On these bases-that the rule 4(f) bulge provision is the equivalent of
federal statutes authorizing nationwide federal process and thus subject to
a federal test of amenability, and that bulge process was intended to be free
of state jurisdictional law-it may be asserted that the bulge service of
process provision of rule 4(f) implicitly contemplates a federal standard of
amenability, such that the issue is within the scope of the Hanna exception
to the Erie- York mandate that state law be followed.
D. A Constitutional Standard of Amenability to
Bulge Process and the Byrd Doctrine of
Countervailing Federal Policy Considerations
Under the doctrine of countervailing federal policy considerations
announced in Byrd, a federal diversity court may follow federal procedure
295. Foster, supra note 124, at 97-98. See text accompanying notes 119-40 supra.
296. Id.
297. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
298. Vestal, supra note 19, at 1061; citing Memorandum on Comments of the Reporter to the
Advisory' Committee on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 409.
299. Vestal, supra note 19, at 1060-61.
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not explicitly covered by the federal rules-even though a parallel state
procedure is outcome-determinative-if the federal practice embodies a
federal policy of sufficient importance to outweigh a state's valid interest in
application of its law.300 This type of approach to the standard of
amenability issue appears to have been recognized and applied in
Arrowsmith, even though the court there found no express federal policy
favoring a federal test of the amenability to suit of an original party
defendant in a diversity action.01
In the context of rule 4(f) bulge service of process, however, there
appears to be a more compelling basis for finding countervailing
considerations of policy sufficient to override state law. Bulge process
reflects a policy, found throughout the federal rules and jurisdictional
statutes, of resolution of complex controversies in one judicial
proceeding. 30 2 It is a clear indication of the strong federal interest in just
and efficient determination of multiparty, multistate litigation encompass-
ing a scope far broader than the law of any one state.30 3 Underlying bulge
process is the recognized necessity for the existence of a federal judicial
system capable of adjudication of controversies which the state court
systems do not and cannot accommodate.30 4 The integrity of such a federal
system can best be maintained by allowing trial by federal standards 3 5 -
a legitimate federal interest3°6 -particularly when the federal courts are,
as in the case of rule 4(f) bulge process, exercising extraterritorial juris-
diction that has no counterpart in the parallel state judicial systems.
These federal policies favored by rule 4(f) bulge process appear to be
of sufficient gravity, under a Byrd analysis, to allow a federal diversity
court to forego a state law standard of amenability arguably required by
the Erie- York doctrine and to adopt a test of amenability to bulge process
founded solely on federal law. Although it may be asserted that these
policies do not rise to the constitutional level of the issue in Byrd-and thus
are not sufficient to outweigh state law-it appears that countervailing
federal considerations may also arise from federal statutes,307 and perhaps
even by implication.30 8 As such, policies favored by the Federal Rules of
300. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536-38 (1957). See also text
accompanying notes 141-55 supra.
301. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d at 226.
302. See text accompanying notes 31-48 supra.
303. Vestal, supra note 286, at 269-70.
304. Id. at 269; Kaplan, supra note 19, at 632.
305. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d at 513.
306. Vestal, supra note 286, at 268.
307. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d at 256-58. See also Sevits v. McKiernan-Terry
Corp., 270 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350
U.S. 198 (1956) and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski, 286 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1960) (both apparently
require that federal policy considerations be of a constitutional stature).
308. Note, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1662, 1665 (1961).
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Civil Procedure should be of sufficient import to justify a Byrd balancing
analysis. 0 9
A more imposing obstacle to deciding that a federal standard of
amenability to bulge process is permissible in a diversity action by a Byrd
exception to Erie is the apparent requirement of Byrd that a parallel state
practice be merely one of form and mode not bound up with state-created
rights and obligations. 0 The impact of this aspect of Byrd appears to be
that if the state procedure at 'issue is a clear expression of state policy,
rather than merely a matter of administrative orjudicial convenience, then
the state law must be followed regardless of the presence of countervailing
considerations of federal policy.311 Therefore, under a Byrd approach to
the standard of amenability issue, it would seem that a balancing analysis
of the countervailing federal and state policies is necessary on a case-by-
case basis, with the availability to a federal diversity court of a federal
standard of amenability to bulge process hinging upon the merits of the
state policy that supports the parallel state rule.
E. Inapplicability of the Erie-York Doctrine to
Federal Rule 4(1) Bulge Process Amenability Issues
As suggested by the preceding discussion, the apparent mandate of
the Erie- York doctrine that a state law standard of amenability govern
bulge process issued by a federal diversity court may possibly be overcome
by a Hanna or Byrd analysis of the quesiton, although there are
obstacles-some perhaps insurmountable-to these approaches. The
foregoing discussion, however, was based upon the assumption that, under
York, a standard of amenability to bulge process would be considered
outcome-determinative and thus substantive for the purposes of Erie. If
that is the case, and if the twilight zone issue cannot be resolved in favor of
a federal test of amenability by either a Hanna or Byrd analysis, then Erie
clearly demands that state law control. It may be, however, that the
question of the appropriate test of amenability to rule 4(f) bulge service of
process is outside the scope of the Erie- York doctrine.
The Erie- York doctrine was developed in an attempt to eliminate
forum-shopping by requiring that the outcome in a federal diversity court
be substantially the same as that which would obtain in a parallel state
court.3 12 Underlying the assertion of Erie that forum-shopping is an evil to
be avoided is the premise that a federal diversity court is essentially just
309. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1963) (federal policy of rule
41(b)); Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960) (federal policy of rule43(a)); Iovinov.
Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959) (federal policy of rule 25(a)); Sevits v. McKiernan-Terry Corp.,
270 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (federal policy of rule 4(f)).
310. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. at 536-38; Szantay v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 349 F.2d at 63-64.
311. Vestal, supra note 286 at 268-69.
312. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 78; Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. at 108-09.
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another court of the state in which the federal court is held, so that the
jurisdictional reach and adjudicative abilities of the state and federal
diversity court systems should, as nearly as practicable, be identical.31 3
This assumption, however, ignores the reality that there are legal
controversies incapable of resolution by state judicial systems, and that are
uniquely suited for adjudication in the context of federal diversity
jurisdiction.314 Rule 4(f)'s bulge service of process provision was
promulgated to remedy just such a deficiency in state judicial capability by
providing an available federal forum for certain types of complex
multiparty, multistate litigation.3'5 Such a situation was not contemplated
by the Erie- York doctrine. Erie's policy of avoiding forum-shopping was
conceived in the context of legal actions that could be litigated in either the
federal or state courts. Rule 4(f) bulge service of process relates to
controversies that are incapable of resolution by state courts. This
distinction would appear to place bulge service of process outside of the
forum-shopping concern of Erie.
Moreover, although the availability of rule 4(f) bulge service of
process may lead to forum-shopping by fostering a preference for a federal
forum in which all parties necessary for complete resolution in one
proceeding can be reached, such an outcome was clearly intended by the
drafters of rule 4(f). At least in this instance, forum-shopping cannot be
regarded as an evil to be absolutely avoided. Rather, it must be viewed as a
trade-off that allows the federal courts to resolve complex litigation in the
most efficient-and perhaps the only possible-manner. At least one
commentator has suggested that the mandates of Erie are inappropriate
when the issues awaiting adjudication are of a complex multiparty, multi-
state nature requiring law broader than that available in any one state.31 6
This appears to be a particularly well-reasoned perspective when rule 4(f)
bulge service of process is at issue, given its policy to aid in the resolution of
just such complicated controversies.
The Erie- York doctrine was developed in the context of judicial
systems exercising personal jurisdiction within the constraints imposed
by traditional concepts of geographically determined state territorial
boundaries. Federal rule 4(f) bulge process, however, is an exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction limited not by geographic considerations, but
rather by legislative policy decisions in an area in which Congress or its
rule-making delegate may provide for nationwide federal jurisdiction.3 7
Unlike traditional methods of service of process that exist in both the state
and federal judicial systems, bulge service of process is a creature of federal
313. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. at 108-09.
314. Kaplan, supra note 19, at 632.
315. Id.
316. Vestal, supra note 286 at 271.
317. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. at 442; Sprowv. Hartford Ins. Co., 594
F.2d at 416; Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d at 226. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
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law and is unique to the federal system. Moreover, the concept of an
expanded federal forum found in rule 4(f)'s bulge provision has no
counterpart in the parallel state court systems. It seems incongruous to
attempt to fit federal policies and devices such as bulge process and
extraterritorial diversity jurisdiction into a theoretical and precedential
mold, such as the Erie-York doctrine, that is built upon a traditional
structure of jurisdictional law and principle defined by state territorial
limitations, when the innovative federal concepts and the traditional legal
structures simply do not mesh.
For these reasons, it appears logical to conclude that federal rule 4(f)
bulge service of process and its associated standard of amenability
question are outside the scope of the Erie- York doctrine. Once freed from
the bonds of Erie, there are no obstacles to a federal diversity court's
application of a test of amenability to bulge service of process based solely
on the due process limitations on a federal court's exercise of in personam
jurisdiction and on the 100-mile constraints found in the grant of
extraterritorial authority.
IX. CONCLUSION
A standard of amenability to federal rule 4(f) bulge service of process
based solely on the due process constraints of the fifth amendment and the
100-mile limitation imposed by rule 4(f) in its grant of extraterritorial
authority, similar to that developed by Sprow, is clearly preferable to the
various state law tests previously applied because a federal standard more
effectively affords realization of the policies underlying rule 4(f). Neither
considerations of constitutional due process nor any provision of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prevent application of such a federal test.
Indeed, a federal standard of amenability appears to follow from the
Constitution and the federal rules.
Moreover, the Erie- York doctrine does not bar a federal test of
amenability to bulge process. Even if the twilight zone issue is considered
substantive for the purposes of Erie- York, it appears that both a Hanna
and Byrd exception to Erie exist and permit a federal test. The best
reasoned course, however, is a finding that the issue of the appropriate
standard of amenability to bulge process is outside the contemplation of
the Erie- York doctrine. As a result, there is nothing to prevent amenability
to bulge service of process from being tested by a federal standard.
Steven V. Tigges
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